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CHARLES MASON'S INFLUENCE
ON IOWA JURISPRUDENCE
By Willard I. Toussaint
Charles Aldrich, a noted curator of the Iowa State De-
partment of History and Archives, was once asked to name
the two greatest men in Iowa's history. He chose fonner
govemor Charles W. Grimes and Charles Mason, first Chief
Justice of the Iowa Territorial Supreme Court. If others were
likewise asked to select Iowa's foremost historical figures, there
would certainly be a wide difference of opinion; but there can
be no doubt tliat Gharles Mason was a prominent business and
civic leader in the State's early history.' For more tban 40
years he was an outstanding figure in judicial, political, and
business affairs." It is to the period of Mason's judicial career
in Iowa, 1838-1851. that the present study relates.
A native New Yorker, Mason
had graduated from West Point
in 1829, then resigned his commis-
tion to practice law briefly in the
East before coming to Iowa in
ia37. After settling in Burlington,
he was district attorney in Des
Moines and Van Buren counties
while Iowa was still part of Wis-
consin Territory. In 1S38 he was
appointed by President Martin
Van Buren to be Chief Justice of
the newly formed Iowa Territory.
He held this position nine years,
Charles Mason f^oj^  jyjy^ 1838, tO May, 1847.
During this time. Mason helped the legislature formulate
statutes under whieh tlie judiciary was to function. After
Mason left the Supreme Court, the Iowa legislature selected
'Edward Stiles, ReeoUecHons and Sketches of Notable Lawyers and
Public Men of Early Iowa ( Des Moines, 1916), p. 19.
^Georye Wright, "The Yewell Portrait of Charles Mason,' Annals oj
Iowa, Third Series, II (July, 1895), 164.
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him to be one of three commissioners to prepare a state law
code, which was adopted in 1S51. For the next four years he
was United State Commissioner of Patents; and from the
expiration of this term of service until he died in 1882 he
was actively engaged in the management of various important
financial enterprises in Iowa.^
An analysis of Mason's legal decisions as Supreme Court
justice raises the question of whether any general trend can
be discemed in them. If so, the fact is significant because it
suggests that one Supreme Court jurist left the pattern of his
legal and economic views on early Iowa jurisprudence. This
observation becomes even more significant if it is sustained
in Mason's otiier legal work, in collaboration with the legis-
lature, and later in the codification of Iowa law. The analysis
also points out the nature and extent of Mason's influence on
the formulation of Iowa law. During the years of his service
on the bench, he heard and determkied questions of great
importance and established precedents which the courts have
followed ever sinee. The work of the Territorial Supreme
Court, then, was very important in that it gave form and
direction to all future state law.*
One should judge Mason's contributions to Iowa law in
the light of his limited legal training and experience before
coming west. In his summer vacations, while still at West
Point, he had begun to read law. After the close of his mili-
tary career, he entered the law office of a New York attomey,
where he read law for a year, passed the bar examinations
in June, 1832, and was admitted to practice in New York State.
In the fall of that year he moved to Newburgh-on-the-Hud-
son, where he practiced law for two years. In 1834 he re-
tumed to practice in New York City.^ Thus his legal experi-
ence before settling in the West in 18.37 totalled only flve
years.
Another factor to be noted before assessing Mason's ju-
dicial contributions to his adopted state is that he had evi-
^Knilin M'Clain, "Charles Mason - Iowa's First (iidist," Annals of
Iowa, Third Series, IV (Jan. 1901 ), 598.
-Wright, "The Yewell Portrait," p. 171.
^Charles Remey, Life and Letters of Charles Mason {16 vols., Wash-
ington. D. C, 1939, I, 4.3. - :.
374 ANNALS OF IOWA
dently formulated his legal philosophy before eoming west.
His diary notes indicate disillusionment with the way law was
practiced in New York. In comparing conrt procedure in the
East with what he had observed in the West, he wrote:
I like the course of judicial proceedings here much better
than in our state. Legal ciiiibbles here meet with much less con-
sideration than in our courts, and justice does not so frequently
fall a victim of chicanery and technical formality. The devia-
tion of a word of plirase of mere form does not so shock the
fastidious ear of justice as to cause her to deny the injured
but unfortunate wretch a hearing.*
Thus early in Mason's legal career he indicated preference for
court rulings based on what seemed obvious justice rather
than strict adherence to judicial form.
Mason made a start in public life shortly after coming
west. He spent the winter of 1836-1837 in Belmont, capital
of Wisconsin Territory, of which Iowa was then a part.' The
capital was temporarily moved to Burlington while prepara-
tions were made for reception of the legislature in Madison,
which was to be the permanent seat of government. That
part of Wisconshi Territory west of the Mississippi was con-
stituted the third judicial district and David Irvin, one of the
federal judges, was assigned to it. When Judge Irvin decided
to make Burlington his home. Mason accompanied him there
in February, 1837.^  Two monthers later, Govemor Henry
Dodge of Wisconsin Territory appointed Mason the public
prosecutor of Des Moines county, a post he filled until April,
1838. When the Wisconsin legislature created several new
counties. Mason was made temporary district attorney for
Van Buren county.'-' Thus in spite of Mason's laek of extensive
legal training or experience, he found himself launched on
a public career at the frontier.
After Iowa became a separate territory in June, 1838,
President Van Buren appointed Mason as Chief Justice of
"Charles Mason Diary, August 5, 1836, in Mason Collected Papers and
Diaries, Iowa State Department of History and Archives, Des Moines,
Vol. 46.
'Jacoh Swisher, "A lust Man," Palimpsest, XIX (Iowa State Historical
Society, Sept. 1938 ), p. 361.
•^Swisher, "Judiciary of the Territory of Iowa," Iowa Journal of History
and Politics. XX (April, 1922). 245.
ey, Life and Letters of Charles Mason, 1, 78.
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the Territorial Supreme Court. As Mason's associates on the
bench, tiie President appointed Joseph Williams of Musca-
tine and Thomas S. Wilson of Dubuque. However, in the
nine-year period during which Mason served as Chief Justice,
his influence must bave been predominant not only in tbe
labors but in the judgments of the tribunal. In the Terri-
torial period from 1838-1846 the court decided 191 cases, and
in only 25 of these did the other two judges write opinions.'*
The large share of legal business over which Mason pre-
sided on the district level gave him additional opportunity
to express bis judicial philosophy during the court proceed-
ings of the Territory. During the time that the three judges
sat on the bench they fnnctioned within a judicial system
which divided the Territory into three judicial districts. Each
Supreme Court Justice was assigned to a district court; and
when cases were appealed, the three justice would consti-
tute the highest tribunal. Mason was assigned to tbe first
judicial district, composed of the two southem tiers of coun-
ties. In the eight years of the Territory this area contained
more than half the population; as a result, a proportionately
large share of tbe legal business was transaeted tiiere." More-
over, there were occasions on which the Chief Justice not
only presided over his own judicial district but that of his
associates as well. Dubuque, Cedar, and Jackson counties
were in the judicial district assigned to Justice Wilson; but
because cases were pending in which Wilson had been re-
tained as counsel. Chief Justiee Mason presided over the first
courts held in Dubuque and Jackson counties.'^
Some cases which came before the Supreme Court are
noteworthy because tliey illustrate Mason's unwillingness to
allow legal technicalities to negate apparent justice. In cases
involving law and order, for example, he frequently refused
to allow legal minutiae to obscure the real intent of the law.
In Indian v. Teagarden he refused the appeal of a murder
conviction in which the defendant contended that the verdict
was invalid because the jury was not lawfully and properly
'"M'Clain, "Charles Mason—Iowa's First Jurist," p. 598.
"Letter of Charles Mason to Edward Stiles, Jan. 23, 1882, in Stiles,
Recollections, p. 25.
'^Swisher, "A Jnst Man," p. 358.
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sworn. In this case the jury had convicted an Indian of mur-
dering a white man; subsequently the defendant carried the
case to the territorial Supreme Court. Mason held that he
could not sustain such an objection after the ease had gone
to trial and the jury had rendered a verdict. In reading the
decision, Mason said:
The proceedings below will be presumed to have been
correct unless the contrary is shown by the plaintiff. . . . It
would be subversive of justice to lülow a party to remain silent
in relation to matters of this nature until after the final hearing,
and then obtain a rehearing of the case and put the public to
the trouble and expense of a new trial, merely because a clerk
of the district court omitted a caption to his transcript.*^
In the case of Hight and Might v. the United States Mason
followed the same general philosophy of not allowing legal
form to take precedence over justice. George W. Hight and
George V. Hight had been indicted upon charge of murder.
They subsequently brought action on a writ of habeas corpus
for purpose of being admitted to ban. It was contended for
them that evidence against them before the grand jury was
so slight that they were entitled to be released on bail. When
the district court refused to bail the prisoners, their lawyer
appealed the ease to the Supreme Gourt. Ghief Justice Mason
ruled that while an indictment furnishes no presumption of
guilt against a defendant on trial, it furnishes strong presump-
tion of guilt in all proceedings between indictment and trial.
He declared that although it is within the power of the court
to grant bail, a defendant cannot in capital offenses demand
bail as a natural right. Mason ruled that the court was not
required to investigate the e\'idence upon which indictment
is found, and that findings of a grand jury are conclusive
against the prisoner, although they may have been found on
slight evidence.'^
There were other cases in which Judge Mason was un-
willing to see legal formality used as a weapon against a de-
fendant. In Edward Powell v. the United States Mason ruled
that it is not necessary that a defendant plead, the presump-
. Teagarden in Easton Morris (ed.). Reports of Cases
Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Iowa, 1, 335.
'*Hight and Hight v. United States in Morris (ed), Iowa Heports, I,
407.
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tion being that he would plead not guilty. In this instance
the court gave the defendant benefit of the doubt without
insisting on a technicality.'' Likewise in Harrell v. Stringßeld
Mason ruled that technical phraseology in the verdict was
not material and that an error which could do no harm was
insufficient to justify a reversal of judgment.'^ Mason was
willing to allow form to have its way only when it did not
obstmct justice. Thus in Gordon and Washburn v. Higley
Mason ruled that a district court could direct such change
in a jury's verdiet as to make it correspond to usual forms
whenever such change could not by any possibility alter the
evident meaning of the verdict."
Chief Justice Mason also put obvious justice before tech-
nicalities in cases involving debt. An instance of this kind
with respect to debt was Mason's refusal of appeal by Robert
Lucas on a writ of error. A suit had been brought iu the dis-
trict court of Muscatine county against Robert Lucas for pay-
ment of a promissory note. A sheriff had served notice of the
suit, leaving a copy of the writ at the home of Charles Nealley,
referred to in the lega! paper as "the usual plaee of residence"
of Robert Lucas. At diat time, however, Lucas was living
elsewhere, and defended the suit on the ground that ho had
not been properly sened with notice. The district court held
otherwise. When Lucas appealed to the Supreme Court,
Mason ruled that there was no ground for complaint against
the ruling of the lower court, and tliat if injustice had been
done Mr. Lucas, his remedy was in equity.^^
Several notable eases involving property also illustrate
Judge Mason's prevailing principle of giving more considera-
tion to apparent justice rather than to legal details. Tbe case
of Swan V. Catliam bears out this point. Chauncey Swan of
Iowa City sold Lot 4 in Block 97 to John Ewing and James
Catham. They paid one-fourth of the purchase price, and
gave three promissory notes, each for the same sum, in pay-
ment of the balance. The certificate of purchase, through
V. United States in Morris (ed.), Iowa Reports, I, 13.
l i-. Stringfield in Morris (ed.), Iowa Reports, I, 18; 335.
n and Washburn v. Higley in Morris (ed.), Iowa Reports, I.
13.
^^Swisher, "Iowa in 1844," Palimpsest, XXV (Iowa State Historical
Society, May. 1944), 150-151.
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error, was made out for Lot 3 instead of Lot 4. Later, Swan
sold Lot 4 to another party. When the notes fell due, Ewing
and Catham refused payment. The local court directed that
the advance purchase money be refunded, and the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision.'"
In Hughell u. Wihon the Supreme Court again protected
rights by giving greater preponderance to the spirit ratber
than the letter of the law. The Territorial Legislature had
passed an act providing that the claimant of public lands who
had designated his claim Init not enclosed it with a fence
could maintain an action of trespass npon the claim. The
Supreme Court held that the statute was valid and that any-
body cutting trees upon such a claim was subject to a fine,
even though the claim holder had no legal title from the
federal government and was himself a trespasser.^"
Indeed, in Mason's notable decision in Hill u. Smith he
carried independence of the letter of the law even to the
point of defending individual property rights against claims
of the national govemment. In March, 1807, Congress bad
passed a law aimed at pioneers who settled upon the public
domain in advance of the surveyor and the land office auc-
tioneer. The law provided that settlers on public lands with-
out right previously ac({nired from or recognized by the
United States should be subject to forfeiture of all rights in
such land and removal by the marshal The (¡uestion was
how such squatters on public domain could be made secure
in possession of their claims until such time as the govem-
ment gave them title. How could such settlers prevent the
government from selling their land and improvements to some-
one else?^'
It is obvious that this federal statute of 18()7 was opposed
to the ambitions of the pioneers. To protect their improve-
ments and retain the soil they had cleared, the settlers formed
"claim eiubs" or "claim associations" which were designed to
frustrate the land speculator and the competitive bidder who
151.
V. Wilson in Morris (ed.), Iowa Ref>orts, I, 385.
J Macy, "Institutional Beginnings in a Western State," Johns
Hopkins Studies in Historical and Political Science, Second Series, VU
(July, 1884), 11.
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eame to secure title at the time of the land sale. These organ-
izations differed in minor details, but in general they had the
same purpose, that of mutual protection of land claims. The
clubs gave deeds and recorded them. Squatters could sell
claims only when the organizations approved, and the buyer
assumed aU obligations of the original occupant^*
The first legislative assembly of Iowa Territory undertook
to define further the legal rights of these settlers. On June
15. 1838, the governor had approved an act providing that
squatters on federal land could use it as collateral for all notes
or contracts. Tlie creditor could sue the squatter and recover
damages as in other contracts where the grantor had the
title to the land.^'' ^^^lether this Territorial enactment was
contrary to tlie United States statutes was not at once clear.
In 1840 the Supreme Court of the Territory interpreted
the law in the case of Enoch S. ilill v. lohn Smith and others.
Hill had signed a note promising to pay $1,000 in one year
to John Smith and Brothers of St. Louis. The collateral for
the note was a claim "or the possessory right to a certain
tract or parcel of land belonging to the United States." After-
ward, Hill argued that the contract was void and the note
illegal because it was given for a claim to United States lands
in violation of several acts of Congress."'*
When this case came before the Supreme Court of the
Territory, Cbief Justice Mason held the contract to be valid,
the $1,000 recoverable, and in addition Smith was granted
$63.83 damages. He based his decision not simply on legal
precedent in Wisconsin law, of which the Iowa law was a
copy,^ ^ but on social necessity. Tlie court concerned itself
with the effect upon the welfare of the people which would
result from holding such transactions illegal. Mason said that
public peace dictated need for some better means of enforc-
ing land claims than a bludgeon or a rifle. Hence the legis-
late had declared that Territorial law should validate contracts
rather than that violence and anarchy should overwhelm the
^ " j . T. Johnson, "Pioneers and Preemption," Palimpsest, XXII, (Iowa
State Historical Society, Sept. 1941}, 257.
'^^Ibid., p. 266.
^^Hill Ü. Smith arul others in Morris (ed.), Iowa Reports, I, 70.
^"Johnson, "Pioneers and Preemption," p. 266.
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whole area. Said Justice Mason:
We believe that in so doing they were not only promoting
the public welfare but tliat they were within their legislative
province, and that the law, therefore, for this purpose is valid
and binding.'^^
Moreover, Mason ruled that the action of the Iowa legis-
lature witb respect to land claims was valid because long dis-
use of the federal statute of 1807 had induced a reasonable
belief that it was no longer in force. Could tbe settlers. Mason
asked, be liable to fine and six months' imprisonment for
violating a law of which most of them where ignorant and
whicb had not been enforced for more tban 30 years, ever
since its enactment? He answered that it was contrary to the
spirit of our institutions to revive, without notice, a penal
statute grown obsolete by disuse., especially when the general
current of legislation showed that the legislature regarded
the statute as no longer in force. Mason supported this con-
tention by an illusion to two English officials, Empson and
Dudley, who during tiie reign of King Henry VIII were exe-
cuted because they carried out too rigidly some obsolete and
forgotten laws. Mason concluded his opinion by saying:
Fortified by this authority we pronounce it contrary to the
spirit of Anglo-Saxon liberty, which we inherit, to revive with-
out notice an obsolete statute, one in relation to which long
disuse and a contrary policy had induced a reasonable belief
tiiat it was no longer in force.^''
Mason was contending that a custom of 30 years could repeal
a statute, an argument not likely to appeal to the strict legalist
but consistent with Mason's usual appeal to circumstances and
common sense.
Justice Mason and his two colleagues demonstrated a
similar legal philosophy in Ralph v. Montgomery, a case which
arose in the district court of Dubuque County and untimately
reached the Iowa Territorial Supreme Court in July, 1839."^
The question was whether a Negro slave from Missouri could
move to tbe free territory of Iowa, tiiereby gaining bis free-
dom, or whether his master could apprehend him and retum
him to slavery.
'^Hill V. Smith and others in Morris ( ed. ), Iowa Reports, I, 70.
'''Macy, "Institutional Beginnings," p. 20.
lh V. Montgomery in Moms (ed.), Iowa Reports, I, 1-5.
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It is truc that the Missouri Gomproinise of 1820 had
theoretically prohibited slavery north of the line of 36°30',
the soutliern boundary of Missouri. Supposedly this prohib-
ited slavery forever from the remainder of the Louisiana Pur-
chase, of which Iowa Territory was a part. However. Iowa's
first territorial legislature had passed an act prohibiting any
free Negro from settling in Iowa unless he posted a $500 bond
for good behavior and a guarantee he would not be a public
charge. Whoever either harbored or employed a Negro who
had not given such bond was subject to a $100 fine. The
Negro who failed to give bond conld be arrested and hired
out to the higliest bidder for cash for sLx months. If a slave
had escaped from bondage, any slaveholder might come to
Iowa, and with the help of Iowa officers, arrest and take him
The case of a Negro slave, Ralph, owned by a Missourian,
Montgomery, tested the validity of this statute. Montgomery
had given Ralph a written promise that he would secure his
freedom upon payment of $550. Ralph moved to Dubuque
to work in the mines but was unable to earn enough to pay
anything on his contract. Montgomery might never have
claimed Ralph had not two Virginians offered to return him
for $100. Montgomery accepted the offer; the two .slave
catchers eame to Iowa, swore out an affidavit that Ralph was
a fugitive slave, and procured a court order directing the
sheriff to deliver Ralph to them so that they might return
him to his master. The Virginians then took Ralph to Belle-
vue, Iowa, intending to take him to St. Louis on the first
steamer."***
Before Ralph could be taken from Iowa soil, certain
Iowans acted to prevent his removal. Alexander Butterworth,
hearing of the arrest, asked Judge Wilson in the federal dis-
trict court in Dul)uque for a writ of habeas corpus to secure
Ralph's release from custody. The judge granted it, where-
upon the sheriff overtook the slave catchers and retumed
Ralph to Dubuque. Judge Wilson transferred the case direct-
ly to the territorial Supreme Gourt, which heard it as the
J Dillon, "Address to the Iowa Association of New York," quoted
in Stiles, Recollections, p. 20.
^°Iowa Patriot (Burhngton, Iowa), July 18, 1839.
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July term, 1839.''
Attorneys for the slave owner, Montgomery, contended
that Ralph was an escaped slave, subject to recovery under
the statute relative to fugitive slaves, because he had not
complied with the agreement to pay for tbe price of his free-
dom and was therefore in Iowa Territory without permission.
Montgomery's counsel also argued that Iowa Territory did
not prohibit slavery and that the Act of 1820, whieh prohib-
ited slavery north of 36°30', was not intended to take effect
without further legislative action by the state and territorial
legislatures, thus confirming the action of Congress. The
lawyers maintained that without such loeal laws the federal
law had no binding effect."*"
Ralph's attomey contended that Ralph was entitled to
his freedom because the Compromise of 1820 prohibited slav-
ery in Iowa. He also argued that Ralph was not a fugitive,
since he had been living in the territory with his owner's
consent, nor was he subject to Iowa's slavery ruling of 1838,
sinee he had come into the territory prior to enaetment of
that law.^ ^
Judge Mason rendered the decision after concurring with
Associate Justices Joseph Williams and Thomas Wilson. Mason
prefaced his remarks with frank admission that perhaps it was
not strictly regular for the court to entertain jurisdiction in
the case at all. But since it involved an important question
which might become an exciting one if it remained unsettled,
the court had decided to hear the arguments and to make a
decision without intending it as precedent for future practice
in that court.'''' First, Mason ruled that inasmuch as Ralph
had come to Iowa with his master's consent, he was not a
fugitive, nor could his failure to pay be construed an escape
on his part. Mason recognized the obligation of Ralph for
the debt, but added that his master could not use non-pay-
ment of it as pretext for returning him to slavery.^' As for
the argument Üiat the Act of 1820, which prohibited slavery
V. Montgomery in Morris (ed.), Iowa Reports, I, 4.
., pp. 2-4.
h "The Case of Ralph," Palimpsest, VII (Feb. 1926), 39.
V. Montgomery in Morris ( ed. ), Iowa Reports, I, 6.
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north of 36'^ 30', was meant only as a declaration requiring
state or territorial legislation to put it into effect. Mason ruled
that the federal law was sufficient to prohibit slavery north
of that line and needed no further legislative action to make
it efFectual.^ " Finally, Mason mied that a master who, after
passage of the Act of 1820, allowed his slave to become a
resident in free territory could not afterward exercise any
ownership over him within that territory. Tliis disposed of
the contention of the claimant that the Act of 1S20 had not
provided for forfeiture of slave property found on free soil.^ ''
Ralph was therefore given his freedom. The judges had made
their decision in the light of human justice ratíier tban ac-
cording to a strict interpretation of the law.
Another of Chief Justice Mason's contributions to Iowa
jurisprudence was the aid he gave the legislature in formulat-
ing laws regulating court procedure. On Nov. 21, 1838, the
legislature adopted a joint resolution requesting the judges
of the Supreme Court to fnrnish the legislature with bills
which would form a proper code of jurispmdence for Iowa
and regulate the practice of its courts.''^ Chief Justice Mason's
part in formulating suggested laws concerning judicial pro-
cedure is shown in the communication he sent to the House of
Representatives. Mason wrote:
In compliance with the resolution passed in the House of
Representatives on the 14th inst., I herewith present a bill for
rt'gulating criminal proeedure in eourts of justice. Having been
rciiiiested by one of the members of that body to draft such a
bill, I have been engaged some time in preparing it and had
nearly eoinpleted it when the resolution was adopted. As it is
not convenient at pre.sent to eonsult with the other judges in
relations to this matter, and I am informed it is desirable to
Iiave tht' bill in readiness for legislative action as soon as prac-
tieable, I have been indiieed to present it at once for the dis-
posal of tile House.^ **
Mason then presented a bill for regulation of the courts rela-
tive to criminal procedure. The law as passed by the legis-
lature was entitled "An act defining crimes and punishments."
This law eonstituted the Criminal Code of the Territory. It
'"'Ibid, p. 6.
'"''Iowa Patriot, July 18, 1839.
*^*/<Kjriia/ of the Iowa Council, 1838-1839, Joint Resolution No. 7, Tan.
4, 1839, p. 41.
^ ^ * l of Iowa House of Representatives, 1838-1839, p. 197.
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defined in detail each of the crimes punishable under the
law, designating the nature and extent of punishments applic-
able to each case.*"
Tlie judges also assisted in preparing legislation which
provided for probate courts in each county. As finally enact-
ed tlie law provided for a court of record to be known as the
Probate Court, jurisdiction of which extended to all matters
relative to estates, testate, and intestate. The conrt was to
convene monthly, with some suitable person within the county
to serve as probat judge for a three-year period.*'
Mason and bis judicial associates also introduced a bill
which provided that the district courts be given jurisdiction
in matters of chancery. Among other less important laws they
suggested were those relative to quo warranto, writs of attach-
ment, trespass, replevin, and other civil aetions. In fact, many
of the most important laws passed by the legislature were
penned by Jndge Mason. ^^
Besides Mason's services on the Bench, he made another
important contribution to the laws of Iowa shortly after the
close of his judicial career, when he was largely responsible
for drafting tlie Iowa law code of 1851. A law code, in the
proper sense of the term, is a reduction to writing of all the
laws, systematically and efficiently arranged by the sanction
of legislative authority. The Code of 1851 was the first real
codification of Iowa law, although there had been incomplete
and imperfect attempts previous to that time. A code of what-
ever nature soon becomes outdated. Additional laws passed
by succeeding sessions of the legislature, together with amend-
ments and repeals of existing laws, make new compilations
necessary. By the time Iowa became a state in 1846, there
was need for a new compilation, preferably by men leamed
in tíie law who were not members of the legislature. Between
1843 and 1856 a great deal of new legislation was enacted.
Also, many earlier laws had been repealed or amended, so that
it was sometimes difficult to tell whether a given statute was
or was not a law.'*^
*°Laws of the Territory of Iowa, 1838-1839, pp. 142-172.
*'Ibid., pp. 126-127.
•*^Swisher, "judiciary of the Territory of Iowa," p. 275.
^ ^ ' l , "Charles Mason—Iowa's First Jurist," p. 605.
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Accordingly a liill was introduced in the legislature on
Jan. 7, 1S4S, for appointment of commissioners to prepare a
code of laws for the new state. Two Democrats, Charles Ma-
son and Stephen Hempstead, and a Whig, Samuel Woodward,
made up the commission. Mason was chairman, and it is
generally understood that he did the principal part of the work
of compilation. This necessarily involved a certain amount
of editing, which gave him some opportunity to refleet his own
views respecting desirahle legislation. The Code of 1851 re-
veals how ready Mason was to innovate upon the established
law and strike into new paths. Among other things, he was
in step with the most advanced legislation of his time as to
the personal and property rights of women. He thought tbat
women possessed tbe same inherent rights as men. On his
own responsibility he recommended the most comprehensive
legislation touching the rights of the wife to separate prop-
erty, and the protection of that right. He was prepared for
suffrage for women on the same terms as men. These recom-
mendations were contained in a report that accompanied the
Code of 1851.**
In the light of Mason's interest in business affairs in gen-
eral and public transportation in particular, his attitude to-
ward corporations as reflected in the 1851 Code is particularlv
significant. Dr. William Salter, pioneer Burlington settler,
wrote, "For the general incorporation law of the state, we are
indebted to the wise and sagacious influenee of Charles Ma-
son.'"*'' Mason had already been largely responsible for the
in the constitution of 1846. It had directed the legislature to
first general incorporation law of the state, as pro\aded for
provide by "general laws" for the organization of corporations
other than for "political or nmnicipal purposes." Consequently
in 1847 the first Iowa legislature passed a general incorporation
law which gave corporations power to make such regulations
as they pleased in relation to management of their business
not incompatible with honest and legal purposes, and in other
respects invited the creation of corporations. The Code of
"Wright, "The YeweU Portrait," p. 165.
"Letter of William Salter to Frank Horack, "Some Pha.scs of Cor-
porate Kegulation in the State of Iowa," Iowa Journal of Histoni and
Politics, 11 (Oct. 1904), 487.
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1851, edited by Mason, Woodward, and Hempstead did not
materially alter the welcoming attitude of 1847 toward cor-
porations. And since much of the Code of 1851 was in sub-
stance included in the Iowa Constitution of 1857, Mason's
social and economic views found a place in the highest laws
of the state.*"
This sun'ey of Mason's judicial decisions and contribu-
tions during his 13 years of government service on the bench
suggests that his legal philosophy Rtted that described by
United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo a
century later.. In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Cardozo
said that a judge, as the community's interpreter of law and
order, must supply omissions in the law, correct its uncertain-
ties, and harmonize it with justice. The Supreme Court Jus-
tice called this free decision, whereby the judge sees through
transitory particulars and reaches what is permanent behind
them. He said that judicial interpretation thus becomes more
than ascertainment of the lawmakers' meaning and intention,
whose collective will has been declared; the judge supple-
ments the legislative declaration and fills the vacant spaces
within statutes.*'
This judicial philosophy of broad interpretation seems to
have been Mason's approach to his legal reasoning. He did
not allow himself to be hampered by legal technicalities or
phraseology, but cut his way through to conclusions, assert-
ing whatever he believed justice dictated. This does not mean
that he ignored legal precedents where they were clearly
applicable. It does not mean, either, diat he failed to recog-
nize that legal form is designed to protect, not to hamper
justice. It simply means that he realized there are times when
"new occasions teach new duties and time makes ancient good
uncouth," so that social needs demand one settlement rather
than another.
Mason was not only a broad interpreter but an innovator
•'^ 'Johnson Brigham, lowa~Its History and Foremost Citizens (2 vols.,
Chicago, 1918), I, 225.
"Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven,
1921, pp. 16-17.
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of law. Tliat is, he saw jurisprudence not as dormant but
dynamic, so that it must follow the line of historical develop-
ment, what Cardozo called the method of evolution. It meant
that Mason followed one path rather than another to a deci-
sion because of his conviction that the one selected led to
current justice. This was more tlian what be personally be-
lieved to be right; it was what he reasonably believed some
other men of normal intellect and conscience might reasonably
look upon as right. So in the end, the principle that was
thought to represent the larger and deeper contemporary
social interest put its competitors to flight. Thus Mason was
never behind others in advanced legal ideas. The 1851 Code
reveals how ready he was to innovate upon the established
law and to strike into new paths.
Although Mason's judicial philosophy fitted the frontier
situation, with its new circumstances not always compatible
with established law, it would seem a fallacy to conclude that
frontier conditions gave rise to his legal reasoning. Evidently
he was never a case book lawyer; his regard for the spirit of
justice rather than for the letter of the law was part of his
legal outlook before he came West.
It would seem, however, that in Judge Mason the Iowa
frontier received the type of person the judicial situation de-
manded. In 1838, communication between the frontier and the
national capital was so slow that there was particular need
for territorial judges capable of exercising sound judgment on
their own initiatives. For this reason, legal training and ex-
perience were less important to judicial service on the frontier
than intelligence, energy, a lucid literary style, and adaptable
legal philosophy. In this respect Iowa and the nation received
in the judicial services of Charles Mason one who deserved
well of the republic.

